Introduction
There is a vast literature on the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) , and yet our understanding of what drives FDI has remained seriously deficient. The bulk of the existing literature focuses on one particular set of possible FDI determinants, i.e., host-country characteristics that (may) help attract FDI. The other side of the coin, the characteristics of the firms undertaking FDI and the industries to which these firms belong, have been largely ignored until recently. This paper is meant to help narrow the still wide gap between purely macroeconomic studies on FDI determinants and the nascent literature on the heterogeneity of multinational enterprises (MNEs). We study a firm's choice of what level of ownership to choose when setting up a foreign affiliate. This is an important question for a number of reasons. First, a parent may be more likely to transfer state-of-the-art technology to a wholly owned affiliate than to a joint venture in order to prevent the leakage of technology to the foreign partner (Desai, Foley and Hines 2004; Ramacharandran 1993) . In turn, given these differences in the levels of technology, it has been shown that there are important differences in spillovers from majority and minority owned foreign affiliates of multinationals to the local economy (Javorcik and Spatareanu 2008; Blomström and Sjöholm 1999) . Hence, the decision on the ownership share may ultimately have profound implications for the relationship between inward FDI and growth in the host economy.
We focus in particular on firm characteristics as main determinant of the choice of ownership share in order to link our paper to the recent literature on firm level heterogeneity in the FDI decision (Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple 2004) . To this end we combine two firmspecific datasets on German companies being engaged in India as foreign direct investors.
Germany belongs to the most important home countries of FDI, 2 and India may be second only to China when it comes to concerns about offshoring in the home countries of MNEs.
The bilateral FDI context is clearly relevant for both Germany and India:
1 Kravis and Lipsey (1982: 203) provide a notable exception: "Even in a single industry within a single parent country, firms with different characteristics will have very different propensities to produce abroad or to produce in particular countries." 2 It is only the United States and the United Kingdom whose outward FDI stocks clearly exceeded Germany's outward FDI stocks in 2006 (UNCTAD 2007).
• Germany plays an important role in India's efforts to attract FDI and, thereby, promote the process of economic catching up. In the 1990s, Germany ranked first among European direct investors in India.
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• India's share in German FDI stocks is still relatively small; India hosted just three percent of stocks held in all developing countries in 2006, compared to 13 percent for China (Deutsche Bundesbank 2008) . But German firms employed more than 120.000 workers in India, accounting for almost eight percent of German firms' employment in all developing countries. 4 The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a short overview of the relevant literature. Next we describe the firm-specific data used here, and provide some stylized facts on German firms' FDI and technical collaboration in India (Section 3). We employ OLS and fractional logit models to assess the impact of firm, industry and location characteristics and present the estimation results in Section 4. The effect of several characteristics differs between the establishment of new affiliates by German MNEs and their engagement in already existing Indian firms. Most notably, the productivity of the parent companies matters only for ownership shares in new affiliates.
Previous literature
The bulk of the existing literature on FDI determinants uses aggregate data to assess the importance of location factors at the macro level for host countries' attractiveness to FDI. The major objective of cross-country and country-specific studies alike has often been to identify policy instruments that might be effective in attracting FDI to specific locations (Amiti and Javorcik 2008) . 5 The recent survey by Blonigen (2005: 4) stresses that most of these studies "either ignore … micro-level factors or assume they are controlled for through an average industry-or country-level fixed effect." Analyses on FDI determinants using aggregate data also fail to capture that FDI comes in various forms (e.g., wholly foreign owned affiliates or joint ventures with foreign minority stakes), and takes place in specific industries with varying characteristics (e.g., related to factor intensities).
However, it is by now widely accepted that firm heterogeneity plays an important role in the decision to invest abroad, as established by Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) . Still, a substantial part of the recent empirical literature using firm-specific data has still in common with studies on aggregate FDI that the analysis is restricted to host-country characteristics as possible determinants of FDI. For instance, Head and Mayer (2004) use firm-specific Japanese data to assess some 450 location decisions at the regional level of EU countries. The focus is on the spatial distribution of demand as a pull factor of FDI, rather than firm characteristics that may push FDI. Buch et al. (2005) draw on firm-level FDI data for German companies to assess the relative role of host-country and firm characteristics. They account for heterogeneity mainly by including "a full set of firm-specific fixed effects" (page 84), finding that heterogeneity matters considerably for FDI-related internationalization patterns.
However, the database of the Deutsche Bundesbank offers little information to control for factors that are specific to the German parent firm. 6 Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005) Two particularly interesting papers for our work are by Stähler (2007, 2008) . These papers relate directly to the recent work on firm heterogeneity and examine the links between firm characteristics (notably the productivity) of Japanese MNEs and their internationalization strategies. Raff, Ryan and Stähler (2007) analyze a sequence of internationalization decisions: Controlling for industry and country characteristics, it turns out that more productive Japanese firms are more likely to choose (i) FDI rather than exporting,
(ii) greenfield FDI rather than M&As, and (iii) fully owned affiliates rather than joint ventures. Raff, Ryan and Stähler (2008) build a theoretical model which shows, inter alia, that firm productivity is positively correlated with the choice of ownership share in a foreign affiliate. They find empirical support for this proposition again using Japanese firm-level data and controlling for some host-country characteristics. Obvious questions remain, including consider the continuum of foreign ownership (5-100 percent equity). They find, inter alia, that MNEs with more experience abroad opt for wholly owned subsidiaries; R&D intensity positively affects the first-stage decision to aim at full ownership, while varying degrees of JV partnership are viewed as equivalent in the second stage once full ownership is ruled out. 8 Blomström and Zejan (1991) address the dichotomy between minority and majority ownership, rather than that of wholly owned subsidiaries versus joint ventures.
whether these findings are specific to Japanese MNEs undertaking horizontal FDI, 9 or carry over to vertical FDI and to MNEs based elsewhere, and whether the findings would be robust to a fuller treatment of location and industry characteristics.
In summary, it is widely established that the heterogeneity of firms plays an important role for both the decision to undertake FDI (Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple 2004) and the choice of ownership share (Raff, Ryan and Stähler 2008 ). Yet, there continues to be a shortage of empirical studies combining location characteristics, industry characteristics and firm characteristics and, thus, providing a balanced picture on major pull and push factors of FDI in general, and the ownership structure of FDI projects in particular.
Data and stylized facts
We combine two firm-specific datasets to assess the determinants of German company decisions on engaging in India. The first source, the Indo-German Chamber of Commerce It is in several respects that IGCC (2003) provides a particularly rich database.
Information related to the type and intensity of the German firms' engagement include: the type of collaboration (financial or purely technical), the year when the collaboration started as well as the founding year of the Indian partner firm, 11 the capital stock of the German 9 Note that Raff, Ryan and Stähler (2007) deliberately focus on horizontal Japanese FDI and restrict their MNE sample accordingly. Likewise, the analysis of Raff, Ryan and Stähler (2008) is restricted to 22 OECD host countries where FDI is most likely to be horizontal. 10 The directory excludes collaborations not involving any production such as agency agreements with Indian partners for the promotion of sales on behalf of German companies as well as representative and liaison offices set up by German firms in India. 11 As detailed below, both years coincide if the German engagement results in a new firm that did not exist before.
subsidiary or Indo-German joint venture, the German share in paid up capital, annual sales, and employment. 12 In addition, it is clearly identified where exactly in India the German subsidiary or Indo-German joint venture is located. This renders it possible to account for regional characteristics at the level of Indian states and districts when assessing the determinants of the German firms' engagement.
It is important to note that the unit of observation in IGCC (2003) In order to obtain more information on the German firms being engaged in India, we use Hoppenstedt's company profiles to obtain information on the German parent relating to:
(major and minor) line(s) of business with NACE industry code(s) (version 1.1), location, year of foundation, annual sales, number of employees, and number of (domestic and foreign)
affiliates. We principally draw on the online database of Hoppenstedt (http://www.hoppenstedt-hochschuldatenbank.de). For many companies, however, employment and sales figures are available online only for most recent years. In order to appropriately match the parent firm data with the information on their engagement in India we refer to earlier hardcopies of Hoppenstedt (2004a; 2004b) for data on employment and sales in, preferably, 2002 (or the closest year available).
14 Apart from stand-alone companies, Hoppenstedt presents employees and sales for (i) specific firms belonging to a company group or conglomerate ("Konzern") and (ii) the company group as a whole. We use company group data whenever applicable. Option (ii) is preferred since the decision to engage in India is highly likely to be taken at a higher company level. Moreover, option (i) would involve a downward bias for company size when minor segments of the conglomerate such as holdings provide the legal roof of foreign affiliates, while accounting for a small fraction of the conglomerate's employment and sales.
The firm-specific datasets are complemented by two sets of variables. First, we consider some important characteristics of the industry in Germany to which the parent firm 12 It should be noted, however, that some data are missing for various cases; this especially applies to annual sales. 13 The same applies to the data used by Marin, Lorentowicz and Raubold (2003) as well as Raff, Ryan and Stähler (2007) . 14 While the matching is improved by drawing on Hoppenstedt (2004a; 2004b) , this comes at the cost of losing some observations on German parent firms. The reason is that employment and sales thresholds are somewhat higher (35 employees or annual sales of more than € 3.5 million), compared to the online database.
belongs. 15 Characteristics such as R&D and skill intensity are supposed to be relevant per se for the decision on the ownership share (e.g., Javorcik, 2000) . 16 Second, we consider some FDI determinants that are widely supposed to reflect the host economy's attraction to FDI and which may also be relevant for a firm's choice of ownership share in the foreign affiliate. We include the availability of skills (proxied by the ratio of student enrollment in higher education to population) as well as the cost of labor at the Indian state level. Appendix A presents exact definitions of all variables.
Indo-German financial collaboration (FDI for short) and technical collaboration is concentrated in two major respects: (i) in a limited number of India's states, and (ii) in some manufacturing industries. 17 The regional distribution is concentrated on the urbanized states in the south-west of India and around Delhi. 18 The distribution across states depends to some extent on whether one refers to headquarters or the factory location of the firms in India with
German participation. Many headquarters are located in Delhi, Mumbai or Bangalore, while factories are located in other states. The factory location is of principal interest, notably in the manufacturing sector, when assessing the distribution of production activities (Head and Mayer 2004: 971) . In various cases, however, there is no separate entry of factory location in the IGCC database (294 financial and technical collaborations). We then assume production to take place at the location of headquarters. We also use the headquarter location in cases for which the database lists several factory locations (43 financial and technical collaborations).
Applying this combination of factory/ headquarter location, the top-5 Indian states (Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Delhi, Karnataka and Gujarat) attracted 74 percent of the number of FDI projects. prominently in terms of the number of FDI projects. However, the industry ranking changes considerably when taking account of the size of FDI projects. As noted before, a few exceptionally large projects in the production of motor vehicles affect the distribution of German FDI in India, notably when calculating shares in terms of FDI-related employment.
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The prominence of some large FDI projects is also evident from the characteristics of the IGCC data shown in Table 1 In order to connect our work with the recent theoretical and empirical work on firm heterogeneity in FDI, we focus on productivity as a firm characteristic to see how this is related to the ownership share. In what follows, we concentrate on cases of financial collaboration only (i.e., where the ownership share is strictly greater than zero). Raff, Ryan and Stähler (2008) present a theoretical model and evidence which shows that more productive firms tend to choose higher ownership shares. In order to check whether this is borne out in our data, we present as a first step a diagram plotting the average German ownership share for four productivity quartiles. 22 As can be seen, there is weak evidence that firms with higher productivity have higher ownership shares, but the difference across groups is only marginal. Of course, we are not able to exploit the various dimensions in our data in 22 We find some strong outliers in terms of labor productivity in our data. In order to mitigate their influence we drop observations with labor productivity higher than 2.5 to avoid a bias because of holdings with low employment and very high turnover.
this graph, confounding firm, state and industry variables. In order to get a more complete picture of this issue, we now turn to a more formal modeling of the choice of ownership share. 
Methodology and results
In order to test the relationship between firm, industry, state characteristics and the ownership share we postulate the following empirical model:
gsi i = β 1 size i + β 2 productivity i + β 3 X i + β 4 X j + β 5 X s + e i
where gsi is the ownership share in firm i; size (measured in terms of employment) and productivity (measured as labor productivity) are also at the firm level and there are three vectors of control variables at the firm i, industry j and sector s level. Given that we include the latter two categories of controls we also allow the error term e to be clustered around the industry-state dimension. Note that we focus here also on financial cases, excluding purely technical cases (with zero ownership share) from the analysis.
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Note that we interpret statistically significant coefficients as indicating correlations rather than causality. To do the latter we would have to make sure that there is no correlation 23 We do, however, include these in the sample in a robustness check below.
between the variable and the error term, i.e., take account of possible endogeneity. Given the cross-section nature of our data it is difficult to come up with convincing instruments that would allow us to do this. Instead, we lag firm size and productivity in equation (1) to at least mitigate problems of endogeneity (see Appendix A for details). Table 2 presents the results of estimations of equation (1) order to prevent leakage of the technology to the foreign partner (e.g., Gomes-Casseres 1989).
As the consistently positive and statistically significant coefficients on this variable indicate, the formation of a new firm in India generally implies a higher ownership share by the German parent, in line with this hypothesis.
In line with earlier work we also add a variable capturing the number of industries in which a parent firm is operating to proxy the level of diversification of the parent. Previous papers hypothesize that more diversified parents are less likely to engage in full ownership, although the empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis is weak (e.g., Javorcik 2000; Meyer 1998 ). This variable is, also, consistently statistically insignificant in our estimation.
Another firm level determinant relates to firms' experience of investing abroad. For example, Geishecker, Görg and Taglioni (2008) Column (3) adds two variables to the equation which control for characteristics of the German industry. These are the average wage in the industry as well as the R&D intensity of production. This, therefore, allows checking whether the fact that a parent operates in a high wage (skill) or high technology industry has any implications for its choice of ownership share. Previous literature finds that firms in R&D and skill intensive industries tend to prefer full to shared ownership in order to assure product quality and prevent leakage of knowledge (e.g., Javorcik 2000; Gomes-Casseres 1989). 25 However, the coefficients turn out to be statistically insignificant in our case. This may reflect that the choice of ownership share is not only due to industry characteristics but, more importantly, driven by attributes of the firm (see also Javorcik 2000) .
A distinct novelty of our paper is that we have information on the regional location of the investment and, accordingly, we add two variables proxying characteristics of the Indian host state to the estimation in column (4). The percentage of student enrollment in higher education, a measure of skills at the state level, returns a positive and statistically significant sign. Firms choose higher ownership shares in states with high levels of human capital. We also find that the level of labor costs in a state is negatively correlated with the ownership share -firms locating in low wage states tend to go for higher capital shares in the foreign affiliates. This is in line with previous findings by Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) who argue that higher wages tend to go along with lower foreign equity shares.
One point to criticize in the estimations thus far is that the dependent variable is the log of the ownership share, where the share ranges from 2.5 to 100 percent. Hence, we have a variable that is bounded in this interval. Ignoring this form of the distribution of the variable and using simple OLS to estimate the model may lead to biased results. In order to deal with this more appropriately we use the absolute level of the ownership share, appropriately scaled between 0.025 and 1, and employ for estimation the quasi-likelihood method developed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) . Another potential criticism is that we in effect treat the liberalization of FDI regulations pursued by India as a "big bang" which is captured by a dummy equal to one from 1991 on and thereafter. While this is the contention of some experts, 28 others would argue that there have been gradual changes since 1991 (e.g., CUTS 2003). These may not be reflected adequately in the simple dummy variable included in the model thus far. In order to allow for more gradual effects over time, we therefore include annual dummy variables from 1991 onwards, with the base category being years before 1991. We do not report the coefficients on these 12 dummies (1991 to 2003) in Table 2 to save space, but we note that they are jointly statistically significant (as indicated by the Wald tests reported in the table) and mostly positive and individually significant also. The results of this estimation are reported in column (7), which are very similar to those of the fractional logit in column (6). The only difference is the coefficient on new firms, which is now statistically insignificant. This may indicate that "new firm" captures to some extent time or regulatory effects. Of course, given the nature of our data we cannot comment on causality, but merely establish correlations. Hence, a possible alternative explanation is based on reverse causation. Rather than new and higher-tech projects resulting in higher German equity shares, the deregulation of ownership restrictions provides better incentives to transfer up-to-date technologies. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state-industry level * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% All regressions include industry dummies. In column (1) to (4) these are defined at 3-digit NACE level, in columns (5) to (7) at 2-digit NACE level Column (7) also includes a set of time dummies starting in 1991; Wald test for joint significance of time dummies
Thus far we have assumed that the effect of the independent variables on the ownership share is homogenous across different types of firms. We now relax this assumption. Specifically, we examine whether there are differences in the determinants of the ownership share between affiliates that are newly established firms, and those where the German ownership participation is in an Indian firm that existed already before and continued to operate under the same name. Newly established affiliates in this context include completely new and fully owned greenfield investments as well as new joint ventures with Indian partners that lead to the setup of a legally independent new firm. Why would we expect differences between such new and old affiliates? As shown above, the setup of new firms is generally associated with higher ownership shares. It is reasonable to assume that this reflects the use of more sophisticated technology in these types of affiliates compared to the setup of ownership links with already established Indian firms. Under this assumption it may also be expected that other variables impact differently on the ownership share choice of the two types of firms.
Here we are particularly concerned with productivity. This variable, thus far, has, contrary to expectations, not been an important determinant of the ownership share. We argue and empirically check whether this is due to pooling these two types of firms. It may be the case that for the German investor's engagement in "old firms" with less than sophisticated technology the productivity of the parent does not play a role. By contrast, for the setup of new firms, associated with high technology, the productivity of the parent may be relevant for operating at the technological frontier and further upgrading the level of technology. Hence, we may expect that productivity matters as a determinant of the ownership share of new firms -with parents with higher productivity (thus higher technology) preferring, ceteris paribus, higher ownership shares.
We examine these hypotheses in Table 3 , where we split the sample into "new" and "old" firms and estimate the fully specified model as discussed above separately for the two samples. The results are in columns (1) and (2). As expected, there are indeed differences in the coefficients for these two types of firms. For new firms we find that productivity levels of the parent are positively correlated with the ownership share, while this is not the case for
German capital participation in old firms. This is in line with our reasoning above. The same goes for the proxy of the level of diversification of the parent, which is positively correlated only for new firms. 29 Assuming that diversification is also a proxy for the level of technology this result fits in with our discussion above.
A further difference with the results reported in Table 2 is that R&D intensity in a sector is now statistically significant and positively correlated with the firms' choice of ownership share. This is in line with much of the previous literature which shows that firms in technology intensive sectors are more likely to opt for full ownership in order to protect their proprietary assets. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state-industry level * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% All regressions include two digit industry dummies. Columns (3) to (6) also include a set of time dummies starting in 1991; Wald test for joint significance of time dummies Column (5) and (6) include technical cases, with gsi = 0
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As a robustness check, columns (3) and (4) present estimations which use annual dummies from 1991 onwards to allow for gradual changes in the regulatory environment.
This does not change our results in any important way. Columns (5) and (6) add another robustness check. Recall that the sample used for the estimations includes German capital participations in Indian affiliates -i.e., the capital participation is always larger than zero. In our data, however, we also have information on another type of international cooperation, namely, technical collaboration. In these so-called "technical cases", there is no transfer of capital (i.e., a zero ownership share of the German partner) but there is a transfer of technology. In the last step of our analysis we add these technical cases to our sample. In effect we, hence, add a number of observations with zero ownership share. Reassuringly, our results on the relationship between productivity and foreign ownership share are robust to this change in the sample.
Summary and conclusion
This paper contributes to the recent literature on the heterogeneity of multinational enterprises (MNEs) by analyzing the relevance of firm-specific characteristics when MNEs decide on the share of ownership in foreign affiliates. We combine two largely unnoticed datasets on German MNEs with varying equity stakes in Indian affiliates. The impact of firm characteristics on ownership shares is assessed in the context of OLS and fractional logit models, controlling for industry and location characteristics. In contrast to most previous studies employing dichotomous choice models on wholly owned subsidiaries versus joint ventures, the data used in the present study allows treating the German MNEs' equity shares as a continuous variable.
While the data presents a unique and rich source to study the decisions by German MNEs, the bilateral Indo-German setting of the present paper implies also limitations. Further research is required in several respects. First of all, the findings for German FDI do not necessarily apply to companies based elsewhere. Likewise, the motivations underlying FDI in India are bound to differ from those of FDI in smaller developing countries or advanced host countries. Ideally, one might aim at panel analyses covering various host countries and revealing more than just a snapshot of one particular year. However, such data are at present not available.
The findings that emerge in our empirical analysis are somewhat ambiguous for the overall sample of Indo-German collaborations. Several factors are clearly correlated with higher ownership shares. For instance, larger parent companies prefer higher equity shares.
The formation of a new firm in India, i.e., an arguably more technology intensive engagement than a joint venture with an already existing firm, generally implies a higher ownership share by the German parent. On the other hand, the correlation between the productivity of the parent firm and its ownership share, though positive, remains statistically insignificant -in contrast to what could be expected.
A distinct novelty of the present paper helps disentangle the links between the parent's productivity and its ownership share. The data allows examining whether there are differences in the determinants of the ownership share between the establishment of new affiliates by German MNEs and their engagement in already existing Indian firms. Indeed, the effect of several firm characteristics (and also industry characteristics) differs between these two subsamples of affiliates. Most notably, the productivity of the German parents matters only for ownership shares in new affiliates. It appears that the productivity of the parent is relevant for operating at the technological frontier and further upgrading the level of technology for the setup of a new firm employing relatively sophisticated technology. By contrast, the productivity of the parent does not play a role when German companies invest in existing firms with less than sophisticated technology.
In terms of policy implications our work points to a major aspect of heterogeneity that needs to be taken into account by governments attracting foreign direct investment to boost their growth performance. There is an important distinction in terms of productivity and, by implication technology between newly set up firms and existing firms which attract some capital inflow from abroad. Host-country governments aiming at greenfield FDI by productive MNEs may be well advised to relax foreign ownership restrictions, as India has done since the early 1990s, in order to get better access to foreign technology. 
